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GOTTA GET A GET: MARYLAND AND
FLORIDA SHOULD ADOPT GET STATUTES
Jill Wexler*
I. INTRODUCTION
After suffering mental and emotional abuse for thirteen years,
Rachel, a mother of four, sought a divorce from her husband. 1
Although it was unknown to Rachel at the time, her husband‘s
abuse would continue well after the civil divorce papers were
signed. He refused to give her a Jewish divorce, 2 which would
leave her unable to ―remarry within the Jewish faith,‖3 unless she
abandoned her claims for alimony and child support for her four
young children. 4 While Rachel was anxious to move forward with
her life, she was bound to her former husband in the eyes of the
Jewish faith until he provided her with this divorce.5 After five
long years of bitter fighting and living in marital limbo, Rachel

* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2010; B.A., University of WisconsinMadison, 2007. The author wishes to thank her mom for her love, guidance and
constant reassurance; her grandma for endless inspiration; and Josh for his
encouragement, love and patience. She would also like to thank the rest of her
family for their support: Dad, Abby, and Alan. Finally, she would like to thank
Professors Aliza Kaplan and Joel Gora for their advice and educational
direction, as well as the Journal of Law and Policy for their editorial assistance.
1
Gail Ravnitzky-Silberglied, JCADA Working to Help Agunot, or
“Chained Women”, http://www.jwi.org/site/c.okLWJ3MPKtH/b.2541223/
k.2C98/JCADA_Working_to_Help_Agunot_or_Chained_Women.htm
(last
visited Feb. 2, 2009).
2
A Jewish divorce occurs when a husband gives his wife a ―get.‖ Plural
gittin. See infra Part I.A.
3
Ravnitzky-Silberglied, supra note 1.
4
Id.
5
See id.
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ceded to her husband‘s demands in exchange for a Jewish divorce.6
She became the sole provider for her four children and had to make
―major adjustments in their lives . . . [she] had to work full time to
pay their bills, yet still could not maintain anywhere near their
former lifestyle . . . [and] their standard of living dropped
significantly.‖7 Rachel‘s story is only one of thousands, which
have been told around the country, featuring women unable to
obtain a Jewish divorce until they comply with their husband‘s
threats and demands. 8
This manipulation of the system is called the agunah problem.9
This Note describes the current state of the agunah problem and
uses the conditions in Florida and Maryland—states with
significant Jewish populations10—to illustrate the need for reform.
This Note focuses on these two states in particular because of the
potential for widespread support, as Florida and Maryland
lawmakers have attempted their own versions of a get statute in
recent years. Although passage of the proposed statutes seemed
close to fruition at various points, administrative and political
hindrances disrupted the momentum. However, an adjusted
approach by lawmakers in these two states, using New York‘s
success as the paradigm, would appropriately counter the growing
coercive and extortive tactics that affect the substantial Jewish
populations in both states and protect burdened women in these
communities who have no other refuge. Such a program would
6

Id.
Id.
8
Over the past twenty-five years, divorce rates have grown to
approximately thirty-three percent of marriages. Jeremy Glicksman, Almost, But
Not Quite: The Failure of New York‟s Get Statute, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 300, 302
(2006); see also FL. JUD. SERVS., BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, S. 2008-96, at 5 (Fl. 1008), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/
data/session/2008/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2008s0096.ju.pdf [hereinafter FL.
JUD. SERVS.]. Almost six million Jews live in America, and data reveal that
15,000 Orthodox Jews in New York are considered to be in ―marital limbo‖ and
unable to obtain a Jewish divorce. Glicksman, supra at 302–03. ―Marital
Limbo‖ is a term of art designed to describe the position of an agunah. See id. at
303.
9
See discussion infra Part I.B.
10
See infra notes 106, 108.
7
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require minimal state funds, and a properly drafted law could avoid
the limited constitutional entanglements with respect to the First
Amendment. In light of the success of the New York get statute,
the adoption of similar statutes in both Florida and Maryland
should be encouraged as a necessary action by these state
governments.
In Part I, this Note outlines the current problem of the agunah11
and presents some of the major legal and non-legal attempts to
alleviate the problem. While contract law offers a legal solution,
this has generally been unsuccessful because holdings are
unpredictable, especially in different jurisdictions. Non-legal
options have also been attempted, but result in inconsistencies and
inequitable remedies. Legislation is a better alternative because it
provides uniformity on which people can rely and deters husbands
from engaging in coercive tactics. In Part II, this Note surveys the
different forms of legislation that have been proposed in Florida
(Removal of Religious Barriers to Remarriage) and Maryland
(Equitable Distribution Law), and discusses why these types of
statutes are necessary in both states. Next, in Part III, this Note
addresses the constitutional concerns that may arise from these
proposed statutes and suggests how a properly drafted law, such as
the law passed in New York, can alleviate such concerns. Lastly,
using the New York law as a paradigm, this Note provides
suggestions for Maryland and Florida concerning ways they can
improve their proposed get statutes.
A. The “Get”
Although divorce laws in the United States have long enabled
parties to dissolve their marriages with support of the civil system,
for many observant Jewish women the divorce process is more
complicated and problematic. While Jewish principles encourage
marriages to be permanent and ―indissoluble union[s],‖ it is also
recognized that matrimonial unions are sometimes breached. 12 One

11

See discussion infra Part I.B.
BENJAMIN MIELZINER, JEWISH LAW
(Bloch Publ‘g Co. 1901).
12

OF

MARRIAGE

AND

DIVORCE 115
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main passage in Deuteronomy anticipates marital problems and
describes the manner in which one should obtain a divorce. This
passage states:
When a man hath taken a wife, and married her, and it
come to pass that she found no favor in his eyes, because
he hath found some uncleanness in her: then let him write
her a bill of divorcement, and give in her hand, and send
her out of his house. And when she is departed out of his
house, she may go and become another man‘s wife.13
Judaism firmly establishes that human suffering should be
mitigated and, therefore, divorces are acceptable in certain
circumstances. 14
Under Jewish law, a woman becomes free to remarry if one of
two events occurs: one, her husband passes away, or two, her
husband delivers her a get.15 A get is defined as a ―bill of
divorce,‖16 which a wife must receive and only a husband can
deliver.17 The standard form of a get document reads as follows:
On the __________ day of the week, the __________ day
of the month of __________ in the year __________ from
the creation of the world according to the calendar
reckoning we are accustomed to count here, in the city
__________ . . . which is located on the river
__________ . . . and situated near wells of water, I,
__________ . . . the son of __________ . . . who today am
present in the city __________ . . . which is located on the
13

Id. at 116 (citing 24 Deuteronomy 1:2 (King James)).
Id. The Beth Din, ―a duly constituted court of Jewish Law,‖ IRWIN H.
HAUT, DIVORCE IN JEWISH LAW AND LIFE 145 (1983), will allow a wife to
demand a divorce if her husband: develops a terrible disease, is sterile or
impotent, does not provide support, declines cohabitation, physically or verbally
abuses her, compels his wife to violate religious law, engages in physically
revolting occupations, becomes an apostate, or habitually engages in acts of
infidelity. Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha,
Contract, and the First Amendment, 51 MD. L. REV. 312, 333 n.80 (1992). See
also MIELZINER, supra note 12, at 123.
15
HAUT, supra note 14, at 17; see also Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 319.
16
HAUT, supra note 14, at 145.
17
Id. at 18.
14
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river __________ . . . and situated near wells of water, do
willingly consent, being under no restraint, to release, to set
free and put aside thee, my wife __________ . . . daughter
of __________ . . . who art today in the city of
__________ . . . which is located on the river
__________ . . . and situated near wells of water, who has
been my wife from before. Thus do I set free, release thee,
and put thee aside, in order that thou may have permission
and the authority over thy self to go and marry any man
thou may desire. No person may hinder thee from this day
onward, and thou are permitted to every man. This shall be
for thee from me a bill of dismissal, a letter of release, and
a document of freedom, in accordance with the law of
Moses and the Sages Israel. 18
As described in eyewitness accounts, the get process is a
simple one-hour ceremony performed in front of three rabbis. 19
The parties spend most of their time in front of the rabbi filling out
paperwork with proper names, dates, residences, and words of
separation, and then two witnesses sign the bottom of the
document.20 At the end of the ceremony, the husband and wife are
asked whether either of the parties were coerced or placed under
duress or extortion to enter into the agreement. 21 Following this,
the husband takes the document and places it in his wife‘s hand;
this marks the official delivery of the get.22 At this point, the
woman is permitted to marry another man, subject to certain
restrictions. 23 In comparison, a civil divorce is not considered a
18

6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 131 (1971); HAUT, supra note 14, at 17–18.
Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 320.
20
See id. at 320–21; see also HAUT, supra note 14, at 27.
21
Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 321.
22
Id.
23
Id. The only men she may not marry are:
(a) a Cohen-descendent of the priestly class, (b) a man with whom she
committed adultery, (c) persons who served as witnesses for the get, (d)
her former husband if in the interim she marries someone else who then
dies or divorces her, or (e) her former husband if she was guilty of
adultery during the course of a marriage.
19

Id.
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valid substitute to the get in the eyes of Conservative and Orthodox
Jews, and thus in order to religiously dissolve a marriage, this
ceremony must take place.24
B. The “Agunah” Problem
Jewish law leaves a wife in a difficult predicament, whereby if
a husband does not deliver a get to his wife, it precludes her from
the possibility of a religious divorce. This leaves the woman as an
agunah,25 or a ―chained woman,‖ who remains married and cannot
remarry in the Jewish community. 26 The problem of the agunah is
―one of the most complex in halakhic27 discussions‖28 because
once a woman is tainted as an agunah, she is forbidden to
remarry. 29 If the agunah engages in sexual activity with another
man and bears a child, that child is looked upon as a mamzerim, or
―bastard.‖30
To be valid, ―a get must be given by the husband of his free
will and is therefore invalid if given while he is of unsound mind,

24

See id. at 313, 319, 321.
Plural is agunot. Organizations and campaigners believe there are ―tens
of thousands‖ of agunot in the
US alone while Orthodox authorities argue that there are very few. This
is because Orthodox authorities view only the women whose husbands
have disappeared as agunot; all others are mesurevet gittin) [sic]
subjects of get refusal) who are in the process of negotiating a divorce,
even where these negotiations drag on for decades.
Lisa Fishbayn, Gender, Multiculturalism and Dialogue: The Case of Jewish
Divorce, 21 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 71, 96 n.3 (2008).
26
HAUT, supra note 14, at 145; see also Glicksman, supra note 8, at 300.
27
Alternative transliteration halachot, which refers to ―all of Jewish Law.‖
Judaism 101: A Glossary of Basic Jewish Terms and Concepts,
http://www.ou.org/about/judaism/di.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
28
2 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 429 (1972).
29
See Marc Feldman, Jewish Women and Secular Courts: Helping a
Jewish Woman Obtain a Get, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN‘S L.J. 139, 139 (1990).
30
The mamzerim are ―forbidden to marry any Jew except another mamzer
or a convert, and their children are also mamzerim. Thus, the social ostracism is
hereditary.‖ Id.
25
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or under duress contrary to law.‖ 31 Unlike the husband, if the wife
opposes the divorce, Jewish law does not provide her with similar
veto power.32 In order for a husband to be given a divorce, he need
only present a justified reason33 and he may receive hetter nissu‟in,
or ―permission to contract an additional marriage.‖34 The Jewish
husband will not be considered an adulterer for taking a new wife,
nor will his new children be branded as mamzerim.35 All of the
power of a Jewish divorce rests with men—consequently, women
are left standing on unequal and tenuous ground.
The agunah problem has become more publicized in recent
years, as men have increasingly used the impending ―chains‖ both
as a means to extort their wives and as a ―bargaining chip‖ 36 to
demand all of the marital property. Rabbi Irwin Haut explains that
thousands of women have reported to him, as well as to other
rabbis, that they were unable to obtain a get until they agreed
wholesale to the terms their husbands demanded.37 The husbands
use the elusive get as a proxy to extort more beneficial postseparation conditions, including custody of the children and
favorable division of the marital property. 38 In a New York Times
article, the author described former agunah Felice Bienenstock,
and explained that, ―it took her three and a half years to obtain a
get, but only after a civil court granted her a divorce.‖ 39 The author
went on to state that Felice Bienenstock‘s ―husband beat her and
took drugs and said he would give her a get only if she agreed to
liberal visitation rights with their children.‖ 40 These husbands use
31

6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 130 (1971) (emphasis added).
MIELZINER, supra note 12, at 118.
33
See id. at 117.
34
2 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 430 (1972). This requires the husband to gain
the signature of one hundred rabbis. 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 131 (1971).
35
See Lisa Zornberg, Beyond the Constitution: Is the New York Get
Legislation Good Law?, 15 PACE L. REV. 703, 704 (1995).
36
Id. at 705.
37
HAUT, supra note 14, at 101–02.
38
Feldman, supra note 29, at 140.
39
John T. McQuiston, Jewish Divorce Law Plagues Wives, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 1986 (emphasis added).
40
Id. (emphasis added).
32
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the get ―as a weapon in divorce litigation,‖ 41 and Jewish women
are left with two options: give up all of their rights and assets or
accept their position as an agunah in their communities. 42
More recently, the rising divorce rates in this country have
caused the agunah to become more common in matrimonial
actions.43 It has been estimated that thirty percent of Jewish
marriages end in divorce,44 and in New York alone, there are
15,000 Orthodox Jewish women ―who are civilly divorced but
unable to obtain a get.‖45 These women are ―unable to remarry
under Jewish law, and thus are forced to live in marital limbo.‖46
C. Jewish Courts Attempt to Alleviate the Get Problem
The tragedy of the agunah has become so urgent that rabbis,
organizations, and legislators have attempted to resolve the
problem in different ways. Highly sensitive to the women‘s
undeserved suffering, rabbis and scholars created ―Constructive
Consent,‖47 which allows the Beth Din48 to engage in forceful acts
to compel the husband to give a get to his wife.49 The rabbis
rationalized their actions in different halachah; for example, ―[we
must] speak up for those who are mute,‖50 and ―[o]ne who is
41

HAUT, supra note 14, at 102.
Feldman, supra note 29, at 140.
43
See sources cited supra note 8.
44
Mariah Wojdacz, What‟s the real status of marriage in America?,
LEGALZOOM.COM, http://www.legalzoom.com/legal-articles//article13746.html
(last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
45
HAUT, supra note 14, at 101.
46
Id.
47
Feldman, supra note 29, at 143. Constructive Consent is a ―legal fiction
[which] permit[s] a [B]et[h] [D]in to use force and other means of coercion
against the husband until he agree[s] to give a get. The tactics [may] range from
community ostracism to corporal punishment.‖ Id.
48
―A duly constituted court of Jewish Law.‖ Plural is battei din. HAUT,
supra note 14, at 145.
49
Feldman, supra note 29, at 143.
50
Aviad Hacohen, The Tears of the Oppressed: An Examination of the
Agunah Problem: Background and Halakhic Sources, 54 JUDAISM 116 (2005)
(quoting Proverbs 31:8).
42
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halachically required to divorce his wife and refuses to do so, a
Jewish bet[h] din – at any place and at any time – [may]
corporeally punish him until he says, ‗I wish [to divorce].‘ The get
is then written and it is a kosher get.‖51 Rabbis and scholars
rationalize these severe punishments with the explanation that for a
Jewish man who really wants to abide by Jewish law, it is his
obligation to give his wife a get.52 In turn, the Beth Din applies
pressure on the husband to ―release his wife where [his wife was]
warranted.‖53 Rabbi Naftali Silberberg has explained that these
tactics have included sanctions against those who carry on business
with a husband who will not divorce his wife. 54
While ―Constructive Consent‖ has leveled the playing field
somewhat, the legal fiction has crucial limitations. 55 One such
limitation is that only a Beth Din can apply this method, and not a
civil court, or else the get is considered invalid.56 Therefore, a Beth
Din could choose not to intervene if it believes a divorce is
inappropriate.57 The Jewish courts are also limited in applying
force on non-compliant husbands because today, unlike long ago,
Jewish communities live under the laws of their respective states
and must act within those parameters. 58 For instance, Beth Din
judges, or Dayanim, cannot apply too much force upon a husband
or the Dayanim may be held civilly or criminally responsible

51

Naftali Silberberg, Chabad.org, The Agunah, http://www.chabad.org/
library/article_cdo/aid/613084/jewish/The-Agunah.htm (last visited Jan. 31,
2009).
52
HAUT, supra note 14, at 23.
53
Hacohen, supra note 50, at 116.
54
Silberberg, supra note 51.
55
Feldman, supra note 29, at 143.
56
HAUT, supra note 14, at 23–24; see also Feldman, supra note 29, at 143.
A get issued on the basis of threats from a court is only valid if there
has been a finding by the [B]et[h] [D]in that the husband may be
compelled to divorce his wife under Jewish Law, and if a secular court
does not itself compel the execution of the get, but simply coerces the
husband [to follow the instructions of the Beth Din].
Id. (emphasis added).
57
HAUT, supra note 14, at 24–25.
58
Silberberg, supra note 51; see also Feldman, supra note 29, at 144.
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within the state.59 Not surprisingly, as discussed in the next
subpart, other groups and organizations have tried to step in where
the Jewish courts‘ actions are limited.
D. Organizations
Throughout the country, groups have organized to respond to
the tragedy of the agunah. These organizations use different
techniques to persuade the husband to provide a get.60 One such
organization, Getting Equitable Treatment (GET), provides
information and counseling to women who are suffering from this
barrier to remarriage. 61 Other groups exert influence by posting
announcements on websites revealing men who would not give
gittin,62 publishing notices in the Jewish Press, or circulating
agunah pins, which read ―Freedom for Agunot Now.‖63 While
these groups have raised the general public‘s awareness of the
problem, they, like the Jewish courts, lack the authority and
jurisdiction to compel a husband to deliver the get.

59

―In Israel, rabbinic courts can impose fines and order a man to be placed
in jail for refusing to deliver a get. . . . [S]ometimes husbands have spent years
in jail instead of giving gittin.‖ Feldman, supra note 29, at n.35 (citing HAUT,
supra note 14, at 85–86) (emphasis added).
60
HAUT, supra note 14, at 102–03.
61
JOFA Advocacy for Agunot, Other Agunah Organizations and Resource
Links, http://www.jofa.org/about.php/advocacy/otheragunaho (last visited Jan.
30, 2009).
62
The Awareness Center posts such announcements:
Sam Rosenbloom is owner of the succhah.com. He has refused to give
his wife a get (a Jewish divorce decree). He also is non-complaint with
the Beit-din (Jewish court panel). Until he gives a get, his wife cannot
remarry. Please do not buy from his website. Let him know that this is
unacceptable behavior.
The Awareness Center, Case of Sam Rosenbloom, http://www.theawareness
center.org/Rosenbloom_Sam.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Awareness Center].
63
Rivka Haut, Jewish Women and the Feminist Revolution,
http://jwa.org/feminism/_html/JWA033.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
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E. Contract Remedy
Recognizing that non-legal attempts provide limited success,
secular courts have recently begun to confront the get issue in
matrimonial actions. Through the use of contract law, courts have
found either express or implied agreements between couples that
require the husband to perform the get or, in the alternative, find
him in breach of contract. While attempts to use contract law to
deal with the agunah problem have frequently been successful,
outcomes are inconsistent and courts oftentimes fashion remedies
that are not in the best interests of either party. Additionally, these
remedies may be constitutionally problematic under the First
Amendment.64
The contract remedy has proven most effective when a couple
includes a written agreement in their divorce settlement or preannulment agreement in which the husband is obligated to grant
his wife a get once the parties have been civilly divorced. 65 In this
situation, should a husband fail to complete his ―contractual
undertaking[s],‖ the wife would bring an ―equitable action for
specific performance.‖66 In Koeppel v. Koeppel, for example, the
wife sued her husband to uphold their pre-annulment agreement
and deliver her a get upon ―the dissolution of [their] marriage.‖67
The husband moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
provision offended his First Amendment rights.68 The court denied
the motion to dismiss, reasoning that specific performance would
simply compel the husband to do something that he had contracted

64

See discussion infra Part III.
See Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 339–42.
66
Id. at 340. An action for specific performance is brought in lieu of an
action for money damages because financial compensation would be inadequate
in this situation. Many states, like Florida, Ohio and Pennsylvania, refuse to
enforce these agreements, ―either on the theory that judicially compelling a
religious divorce would excessively entangle the state in sectarian matters,
offending the Establishment Clause, or on the narrower ground that such an
order is beyond the statutory jurisdiction of the court.‖ Id.
67
Koeppel v. Koeppel, 138 N.Y.S.2d 366, 369–70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
68
Id. at 373.
65

WEXLER_6-5-09

746

6/6/2009 1:17 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

to do.69 Professor Breitowitz noted that ―the mere fact that a
ceremony, procedure, or activity is governed by religious law does
not preclude its civil enforcement by way of a simple contract.‖70
Over the next several years, the New York courts became more
assertive in upholding express contracts where Jewish women were
being denied gittin. For example, in Waxstein v. Waxstein, 71 the
New York trial court emphasized the ―inherent unfairness‖ in
allowing the husband to obtain all the advantages of the separation
agreement, without fulfilling certain provisions, like the delivery of
a get.72 Although these cases provide helpful precedent for an
agunah, they have limited impact in that they are only applicable
in situations where parties have expressly consented to a get
provision in their agreement.
While many courts have relied on couples‘ express agreements
that have outlined the direct granting of a get, some courts have
presumed the existence of a get when the couple was married in
harmony with religious traditions.73 New Jersey first inferred this
type of agreement in the seminal case of Minkin v. Minkin.74 In that
case, the court held that requiring the husband to give his wife a
get did not violate the Establishment Clause, reasoning that when
69

Id. (―Complying with [defendant‘s] agreement would not compel [him]
to practice any religion, not even the Jewish faith to which he still admits
adherence . . . . His appearance before the Rabbinate to answer questions and
give evidence needed by them to make a decision is not a profession of faith.
Specific performance herein would merely require the defendant to do what he
voluntarily agreed to do.‖). But see Koeppel v. Koeppel, 161 N.Y.S.2d 694,
695–96 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 1957) (affirming the trial court‘s decision to
deny specific performance because the contract was too vague).
70
Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 340.
71
Waxstein v. Waxstein, 395 N.Y.S.2d 877 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
72
Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 341. Significantly, the Waxstein decision is
limited to cases in which the husband denies a get to his wife and she has
completed all of her responsibilities under their agreement. Id.
73
Id. at 343. For example, courts will view ―recit[ing] a formula at the
ceremony that the marriage was ‗in accordance with the laws of Moses and
Israel,‘ or execut[ing] the traditional ketubah or marriage contract‖ as evidence
of the couples‘ connection and submission to religious principles at marriage. Id.
74
Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981). In this
case, a woman moved to require her husband to provide her with a get following
her civil divorce and pay the costs of the Jewish divorce. Id.
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he signed the ketubah,75 the husband agreed to follow the ―laws of
Moses and Israel,‖ and therefore he was required to deliver a get to
his wife because he alleged that she committed adultery.76 From a
contract law perspective, the court found that ―[t]o compel the
husband to secure a get would be to enforce the agreement of the
marriage contract (ketuba[h]).‖77 The court noted that it was
required to enforce contracts so long as the contract was not
unconscionable, would not violate public policy, 78 and would pass
constitutional muster.79 Since this contract obligated the parties to
engage in ―reciprocal obligations pertaining to the marriage,‖ there
were no requirements inconsistent with public policy. 80
The holding in Minkin was later expanded in Burns v. Burns,81
where the court instructed the husband not to issue the get himself,
75

Refers to a ―Jewish marriage contract.‖ Sheri Stritof & Bob Stritof,
About.com: Marriage, Ketubah, http://marriage.about.com/od/jewishmarriage
traditions/g/ketubah.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
76
Minkin, 434 A.2d at 666. The court noted that ―the provisions and laws
of Moses and Israel‖ require the husband to give his wife a get if he alleges his
wife committed adultery. Id.
77
Id. (emphasis added). The same decision was reached by an Illinois
court. See In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(directing husband to deliver his wife a get).
78
Minkin, 434 A.2d at 666.
79
See infra Part III.
80
Minkin, 434 A.2d at 666. Significantly, New Jersey courts have issued
inconsistent decisions regarding get delivery. See Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (refusing to follow Minkin, and finding that
ordering the delivery of a get would violate the husband‘s First Amendment
rights).
81
538 A.2d 438 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987). In Burns, the husband told
his wife that he would grant her a get in exchange for a $25,000 payment. Id. at
439; see also Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 344–45; Edward S. Nadel, New
York‟s Get Laws: A Constitutional Analysis, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 55,
65 (1993). The Burns court held that a husband is required to grant his wife a get
when:
(1) he unjustifiably refuses conjugal rights; (2) if the husband shows
unworthy conduct toward his wife such that the wife cannot be
expected to live with him as his wife; (3) if the husband‘s unjustified
refusal to maintain her when he is in the position to do so, or could be if
he was willing to work and earn an income; (4) if the husband is
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but to acquiesce to the jurisdiction of the Beth Din.82 While the
Burns decision enhanced the court‘s authority to order a husband
to begin the get process, the court was inaccurate in its Jewish
terminology and interpretation of the ketubah.83 Courts‘
unfamiliarity with Jewish terms and practices has resulted in
subsequently inconsistent holdings on this issue, and this is
precisely why state legislatures should adopt statutes for a uniform
solution to the agunah problem. This will enable Jewish scholars
to monitor the legislative process, and ensure consistency with
Jewish law.
As the Burns decision illustrates, a serious problem with using
contract law to require a husband to grant his wife a get is that
courts have to create legal obligations under the ketubah, which do
not actually exist.84 In the ketubah, the husband makes a variety of
promises to his wife concerning the marriage. 85 Notably, the
unfaithful to his wife, or (5) if the husband habitually assaults or insults
her, or is the cause of unceasing quarrels, so she has no choice but to
leave the household.
Burns, 538 A.2d at 441.
82
Burns, 538 A.2d at 441; see also Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 345;
Nadel, supra note 81, at 65. Legal scholar Edward Nadel commented that
[t]here is an important halachic distinction between cases in which a
secular court forces a husband to deliver a get and those in which the
court merely forces the husband to appear before a [B]eth [D]in. In the
former cases, any resulting get would be halachically invalid as a get
me‟useh, since the delivery of the get was coerced, and therefore the
wife would not ultimately gain the relief she desires. In the latter cases,
there is often no such problem, since coercion may indeed be used to
force a recalcitrant husband to comply with the directives of a [B]eth
[D]in that has ordered the delivery of a get.
Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
83
―[T]he Burns opinion makes a number of errors concerning Jewish law—
for example, it describes a get as evidence of a divorce, and it misinterprets the
ketubah . . . .‖ Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 345.
84
See id.
85
These promises include:
(1) a declaration that he has betrothed his wife in accordance with the
laws of Moses and Israel; (2) a promise that he will honor, support, and
work for his spouse in accordance with the custom of Jewish husbands;
(3) an obligation to provide food, clothing, and intimacy in accordance

WEXLER_6-5-09

6/6/2009 1:17 PM

GOTTA GET A GET

749

ketubah is written in Aramaic, which makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to understand; most times, it is not translated into a
language in which the couple can understand. 86 As a result, many
couples consider the document as an element of Jewish ritual
practice, as opposed to a legally binding contractual agreement
with the requisite intent, since the couples likely do not know what
the ketubah says. 87
In sum, while state courts can use contract law to compel
husbands to grant their wives a get, it is not the most ideal measure
a state can take to deal with this problem. Divorce law is a
―creature of statute,‖ so when the state creates legislation to
address this problem it reduces the public‘s uncertainty concerning
the court‘s role.88 In other words, a statute, as opposed to
―discretionary judicial intervention,‖ provides a ―uniform solution‖
to the agunah problem upon which people can rely; a husband will
be aware that he will not be offered a divorce by the state until the
statute is followed.89 Therefore, a statute will better deter Jewish
husbands from utilizing this extortive tool than would inconsistent
applications of contract law.90

‗with universal custom‘; (4) an agreement to pay an alimony lump sum
of 200 silver zuz in the event of divorce or death; (5) an agreement to
pay a stipulated monetary value for property that the wife brings into
the marriage; (6) a promise to pay an additional alimony sum in excess
of the statutory minimum; and (7) the creation of a lien on all real or
personal property, whether presently owned or after-acquired, to secure
payment of all obligations under the ketubah.
Id. at 347.
86
Id. at 345. In In re Marriage of Goldman, the husband testified, ―that he
considered the ketubah to be poetry or art rather than a contract.‖ 554 N.E.2d
1016, 1020 (Ill. App. Ct. 199). Rabbi Rachlis then testified that most couples
view ―the ketubah in a symbolic rather than a literal sense.‖ Id. at 1020; accord
Nadel, supra note 81, at 66 n.91.
87
If this document were to be considered enforceable, a heavy burden of
proof would be placed on the party trying to enforce the contract. Breitowitz,
supra note 14, at 348.
88
Feldman, supra note 29, at 163.
89
Id. at 163–64.
90
Id. at 164.
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F. New York‟s “Get” Statute

While support groups and court decisions involving contract
law have helped many women, the agunah problem is too
pervasive to be handled on a case by case basis, and state
legislation, like that in New York, is necessary. In 1983, the New
York Legislature enacted Domestic Relations Law § 253, known
as the ―get statute,‖ which denies a civil divorce to any party who
does not remove all barriers to remarriage. 91 The statute provides:
No final judgment of annulment or divorce shall thereafter
be entered unless the plaintiff shall have filed and served a
sworn statement: (i) that, to the best of his or her
knowledge, he or she has, prior to the entry of such final
judgment, taken all steps solely within his or her power to
remove all barriers to the defendant‘s remarriage following
the annulment or divorce; or (ii) that the defendant has
waived in writing the requirements of this subdivision.92
This statute was passed to provide a solution to the growing
agunah problem in New York, where recalcitrant husbands were
using their get power to put their wives in unequal negotiating
positions concerning their civil divorces. New York correctly
found that this economic coercion was a matter that needed to be
resolved by the state.93 When enacting the statute, the legislature
91

Id. at 152.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 253(3) (McKinney 1999). New York defines a
―barrier to remarriage‖ as ―any religious or conscientious restraint or inhibition,
of which the party required to make the verified statement is aware, that is
imposed on a party to a marriage.‖ Id. § 253(6). The statute contains two
provisions, which guard against false statements by attaching criminal liability
and allowing a clergyman to counter a false affidavit by stating that the plaintiff
has not really removed all barriers to remarriage. Id. §§ 253(8), (7).
93
Former New York Governor Mario Cuomo stated that the
bill was overwhelmingly adopted by the State legislature because it
deals with a tragically unfair condition that is almost universally
acknowledged. The requirement of a Get is used by unscrupulous
spouses who avail themselves of our Civil Courts and simultaneously
use their denial of a Get vindictively or as a form of economic
coercion.
Memorandum from New York Governor Mario Cuomo approving N.Y. DOM.
92
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took extra precaution to make sure it did not mention Jewish
religious practices, in an apparent attempt to protect the statute
from any First Amendment violations. 94 Unfortunately, the New
York Legislature quickly found that there were other problems
with the statute,95 specifically that ―the bill has had limited effect,
since it is not always the plaintiff, but the defendant who is
recalcitrant in acquiring a [g]et.‖96 The 1983 get statute only
insisted the plaintiff remove barriers to remarriage; if the defendant
did not counterclaim in the matrimonial action, he was exempt
from the statute.97 In this situation, a Jewish wife was advised not
to be the party to file for divorce, since, under the 1983 statute, the
defendant husband would not be required to take all the necessary
steps to remove barriers to remarriage. 98 Frequently, this left the
woman in a precarious situation with only two viable options if her
husband did not file for the civil divorce: remain a member of an
unhappy and unfulfilling marriage, or be stigmatized in her
community as an agunah.
In 1992, the Legislature responded to this problem and created
a new get law by amending New York‘s equitable distribution
statute, which applies to both the plaintiff and the defendant in a
matrimonial action.99 The statute provides that when considering
equitable distribution in marital dissolution, ―the court shall, where
appropriate, consider the effect of a barrier to remarriage.‖100 After
this amendment, New York‘s courts were granted the authority to
take into account any barriers to remarriage when considering the
factors for dividing marital assets and those that must be

REL. LAW § 253 (Aug. 8, 1983) (emphasis added).
94
―Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .‖ U.S. CONST. amend. I. See infra Part
III (discussing constitutional issues).
95
Zornberg, supra note 35, at 733.
96
McQuiston, supra note 39 (quoting Andrew J. Stein, City Council
President).
97
Zornberg, supra note 35, at 733.
98
See id.
99
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. §§ 236(B)(5)(d), (B)(6)(a) (McKinney 1999).
100
Id. §§ 236(B)(5)(h), (B)(6)(d).
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considered in setting maintenance. 101 Lisa Zornberg explains that
the policy reasons at the heart of the 1992 amendment were to
allow courts to fairly assess and divide marital assets, and ―[i]n the
case of the agunah, whose prospects of financial security may be
seriously impaired by her inability to remarry, the 1992 law allows
judges to award the woman a greater percentage of the marital
assets to compensate for this disability.‖102 Following the 1992
amendment, New York‘s get laws have proven to be successful
remedies for agunot within New York.103 Because of the success
of New York‘s get statute and its subsequent reform, it provides a
good model for other states also concerned with ending abuse of
the get system among their Jewish populations.
II. ATTEMPTED LEGISLATION
Currently, New York is the only state to have adopted a get
statute. However, the recent experiences of two states, Maryland
and Florida, demonstrate the difficult tasks of balancing the
positive remedial functions of a state-sponsored get statute with the
underlying constitutional concerns. 104 Since the agunot problem
extends beyond the borders of New York, Maryland and Florida
legislators have similarly attempted to respond to the needs of their
constituents in this tragic situation. 105 Maryland, a state with a
101

Id. §§ 236(B)(5)(d)(1)-(13), (B)(6)(a)(1)-(11). Some of these factors
include: the duration of the marriage, the age and health of both parties, the
income and property of each party at time of both marriage and divorce, the
present and future earning capacity of each party, and ―any other factor which
the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.‖ Id. §§ 236(B)(5)(d),
(B)(6)(a).
102
Zornberg, supra note 35, at 734 (emphasis added).
103
Reports have found that ―[a]lmost simultaneously with the signing of
the law . . . [cases] suddenly resolved themselves . . . . The mere fact that people
knew that it was on the books caused things to be resolved.‖ Id. at 761 (quoting
David Long).
104
See infra Part III (discussing Constitution).
105
Maryland‘s Senate Bill 533 was sponsored by Senators Lisa A. Gladden
(Dist. 41), Gwendolyn Britt (Dist. 47), Jim Brochin (Dist. 42), Jennie M.
Forehand (Dist. 17), Brian E. Frosh (Dist. 16), Rob Garagiola (Dist. 15), Nancy
Jacobs (Dist. 34). S.B. 533, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007). Florida‘s key sponsor for the
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significant Jewish population,106 has proposed get legislation five
times, encountered constitutional hurdles, and most recently fell
one vote short in its Senate of passing a get statute.107 In 2008,
Florida, with over ten percent of the nation‘s Jewish population,108
proposed its own version of a get statute.109 Even though it
advanced further than Maryland‘s proposed legislation, the Florida
bill fell short of becoming law at the House of Delegates stage.110
Unfortunately, because these recent legislative attempts have been
unsuccessful, the agunah problem remains prevalent in both
Maryland and Florida, and requires an innovative solution, built
upon the shortcomings of the previous attempts.111 This section
will outline each state‘s legislative history in the order in which
they were proposed; Maryland‘s failed get statute began to
percolate on the legislative floor in 1997, 112 while the Florida
initiative began in 2007.113
legislation was Senator David Aronberg, who introduced the bill on the Senate
floor. S.B. 96, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2007).
106
Maryland‘s Jewish population makes up 4.2 percent of Maryland‘s total
population and 3.65 percent of the total U.S. Jewish population. AMERICAN
JEWISH YEAR BOOK (David Singer & Lawrence Grossman eds., vol. 106, 2006)
[hereinafter JEWISH YEAR BOOK].
107
Because the ―[l]egislation needs a majority vote to pass,‖ the third
reading failed despite a vote of twenty-two yays to twenty-two nays. E-mail
from Jacqueline M. Greenfield, Constituent Liaison to Senator Lisa A. Gladden
to author. (Feb. 5, 2009) (on file with author).
108
Florida‘s Jewish population makes up 3.7 percent of Florida‘s total
population and 10.1 percent of the nation‘s total Jewish Population. JEWISH
YEAR BOOK, supra note 106.
109
FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, REGULAR SESSION 2008, HISTORY OF SENATE
BILLS, SB 96, at 36, available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/
2008/citator/final/senhist.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2009) [hereinafter HISTORY
OF SB 96].
110
Id.
111
Reliable statistics on the number of agunot are not available, possibly
because of the private nature of the matter. Zornberg, supra note 35, at 718.
However, the large number of organizations dedicated to agunot serves as a
good indication of the scope of the problem. Id. Still, the primary source of data
remains the fact that many people in the Orthodox community have provided
anecdotal evidence of the problem. Id.
112
See DEP‘T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., MD. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FISCAL
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A. Maryland

In the last decade, Maryland has made significant attempts to
follow New York‘s lead and enact get legislation to deal with noncompliant husbands who will not grant their wives a get. With
approximately 3.65 percent of the country‘s Jewish population
living in Maryland, the state has had experience with Jewish
divorces and, consequently, has become aware of the problems of
agunot.114 In one highly publicized case, Sarah Rosenbloom, a
Maryland resident who civilly divorced her husband Sam in 1999,
is still considered married in the eyes of the Jewish faith because
her husband refuses to give her a get.115 In an attempt to help
Sarah, groups like the Jewish Coalition Against Domestic Abuse
(JCADA) and Organization for the Resolution of Agunot (ORA)
have organized protests outside Sarah‘s husband‘s house chanting
―Sam Rosenbloom, unchain your wife‖ and ―Free Your Wife, Free
Your Soul.‖116 Barbara Zackheim, JCADA President, has been
quoted as saying that the get is ―the last vestige of abuse that a
husband can perpetrate on his wife. . . . [I]t‘s incumbent on the
Jewish community to help.‖117 Unfortunately, these efforts have
been unsuccessful and the agunah problem remains prevalent in
Maryland. 118
In response to the situation, Maryland legislators began to
propose legislation in the late 1990s.119 Their yearly efforts were
POLICY NOTE, SB 533 (2007), available at http://senate.state.md.
us/2007RS/fnotes/bil_0003/sb0533.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2009) [hereinafter
DEP‘T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS].
113
HISTORY OF SB 96, supra note 109, at 36.
114
JEWISH YEAR BOOK, supra note 106; DALE E. JONES ET AL., RELIGIOUS
CONGREGATIONS & MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 2000: AN
ENUMERATION BY REGION, STATE AND COUNTY BASED ON DATA REPORTED
FOR 149 RELGIOIUS BODIES (Glenmary Research Center 2002) [hereinafter
RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS].
115
Michelle Boorstein, Ancient Divorce Laws‟ Modern Quandary, WASH.
POST, Feb. 5, 2006, at C01; see also Awareness Center, supra note 62.
116
Awareness Center, supra note 62.
117
Id. (quoting Barbara Zackheim, JCADA President).
118
See supra note 111.
119
The 2000 proposed legislation was favored over the 1999 version
AND
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unsuccessful from 1997 to 2000, and again, most recently, in
February 2007. 120 The 2007 bill, ―Removal of Religious Barriers to
Remarriage Act,‖ was based on the 1983 New York statute and
required ―removal of religious barriers to remarriage‖ before a
civil divorce would be entered for either party. 121 The bill sought to
―address a problem for people who obtain a civil divorce, but still
face religious barriers to remarriage if the party wishes to remarry
within the faith.‖122 It was estimated that the financial implications
of this particular bill were minimal, which suggests that funding
issues would not hamper its passage in the legislature.123
This law, if enacted, would have contained important
limitations in its effect on religious groups and would not have
[a]uthorize[d] a court to order a party to remove a religious
barrier to remarriage; inhibit or restrain an individual from
taking part in ecclesiastical tribunal proceedings for a
decree of matrimonial nullity or dissolution according to
religious tenets; or inhibit or restrain a religious body from

because the 1999 version ―might affect uncontested divorces, and ones where
religious divorce would not be an issue.‖ Divorce Reform Page, Legislation to
Help Agunot—―Chained Women,‖ http://www.divorcereform.org/agunot.html
(last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
120
See DEP‘T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., supra note 112, at 3; Ovetta
Wiggins, Senate, Fearing an Entanglement of Church and State, Kills Divorce
Bill, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/17/AR2007031701126.html; Boorstein, supra
note 115.
121
DEP‘T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS, supra note 112, at 1–2.
122
Id. at 2.
123
The Department of Legislative Services estimated that the proposed
statute would require some increase in general funds of the state due to the
penalty provision. However, because ―[t]he number of people convicted of this
proposed crime is expected to be minimal,‖ there would be no real increase in
funds at all. The proposed statute states that ―[a] violator is guilty of the
misdemeanor of perjury and is subject to imprisonment for up to 10 years. The
State may institute a prosecution for this misdemeanor at any time.‖ All other
requirements of the bill could be covered through resources the state already
possessed. DEP‘T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., MD. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FISCAL
AND POLICY NOTE, HB 324 1–3 (2007), available at http://mlis.state.md.us
/2007RS/fnotes/bil_0004/hb0324.pdf.
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adhering to its ecclesiastical tenets governing marriage. 124
Moreover, rather than affirmatively mandating that the judicial
system require the husband to give a get, the bill would have
ordered the presiding judge to withhold the civil divorce unless
religious barriers were removed, which only the husband could
authorize. Additionally, the proposed bill established boundaries
upon the court so as not to enhance its jurisdiction into religious
rituals and practices. These limitations are significant in light of
the First Amendment controversy, and serve to preserve the
constantly-shifting barrier between church and state.125
This most recent attempt at legislation included a spirited
debate between Maryland representatives concerning both the
constitutionality of the bill and women‘s rights issues.126 Senator
Lisa Gladden, the bill‘s sponsor, ―argued that the measure was not
about religion but ‗about fairness. It‘s a women‘s rights issue.‘‖127
Agreeing with Senator Gladden, The Women‘s Law Center wrote
in support of the bill because it ―removes one tool of power and
control commonly used in abusive relationships.‖128 Other
organizations from all over the state, as well as Maryland‘s
Assistant Attorney General, wrote letters of support to try to
persuade the legislature that the bill would be highly beneficial and
would not violate any constitutional rights. 129 The proponents of
124

Id. at 2.
See discussion of constitutional issues, infra Part III.
126
Wiggins, supra note 120.
127
Id. (quoting Senator Lisa Gladden).
128
Letter from The Women‘s Law Center of Maryland, Inc., to Judicial
Hearings Committee (Feb. 22, 2007) (on file with Maryland Legislative
Services).
129
Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Assistant Attorney General, to Delegate
Samuel I. Rosenberg (Jan. 12, 2007) (on file with Maryland Legislative
Services); Letter from Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America to
Chairman Brian E. Frosh (Feb. 28, 2007) (on file with Maryland Legislative
Services); Letter from The Greater Washington Jewish Coalition Against
Domestic Violence to House Judicial Committee and Senate Judicial
Proceedings (Feb. 22, 2007) (on file with Maryland Legislative Services); Letter
from Maryland Jewish Alliance to Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (Feb.
22, 2007) (on file with Maryland Legislative Services); Letter from The
Rabbinical Council to Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (Feb. 21, 2007)
125
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the bill hoped that recent highly publicized cases, like Sarah
Rosenbloom‘s, would illuminate the problem more clearly for the
legislature and help accelerate the bill‘s passage.130 However,
opponents of the bill, such as Senator Rona E. Kramer, argued that
―the state should not legislate religious doctrine,‖ which she
claimed this divorce bill would largely mandate. 131 Some
legislators were undecided and clearly conflicted, including
Delegate Luiz R. S. Simmons, who found the witnesses at the
legislative hearings to be ―very eloquent;‖ however, he also
appreciated the possible constitutional entanglements, where he
noted that if the bill ―doesn‘t breach the barrier [of the First
Amendment], then it toes right up to it and whistles.‖132
With these opinions in mind, it became unclear how the
legislature would vote. The bill cleared the Senate Judiciary
Proceedings Committee before the legislators voted a first time;
the first vote passed thirty-five to ten.133 In the second vote,
however, the bill failed on the floor at a stalemate, each side
garnering twenty-two votes.134 While the bill was expected to pass
through the Senate, several votes were changed at the last
minute.135 Due to these last minute changes, the bill did not have a

(on file with Maryland Legislative Services); Letter from Maryland Catholic
Conference to Delegate Samuel I. Rosenberg (Feb. 2, 2007) (on file with
Maryland Legislative Services); Letter from The Women‘s Law Center of
Maryland, Inc., to Judicial Hearings Committee (Feb. 22, 2007) (on file with
Maryland Legislative Services).
130
Caryn Tamber, Maryland Lawmakers Debate Constitutionality of
„Chained Wives‟ Bill, BALT. DAILY RECORD, Feb. 23, 2007.
131
Total Divorce, Maryland Divorce Legislation for Orthodox Jews Passes
Senate‟s Initial Vote, http://blog.totaldivorce.com/2007/03/15/maryland-divorcelegislation-for-orthodox-jews-passes-senates-initial-vote/ (last visited Jan. 26,
2009) (citing Rona E. Kramer).
132
Tamber, supra note 130 (quoting Delegate Luiz R. S. Simmons).
133
E-mail from Jacqueline M. Greenfield, Constituent Liaison to Senator
Lisa A. Gladden, to author (Feb. 5, 2009) (on file with author).
134
Because a majority of votes are needed for passage, the twenty-two to
twenty-two vote resulted in the bill‘s failure. Wiggins, supra note 120.
135
E-mail from Jacqueline M. Greenfield, Constituent Liaison to Senator
Lisa A. Gladden, to author (Feb. 5, 2009) (on file with author). ―We thought
there would be no problem passing it at the third reading.‖ Id.
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chance to go to the House of Delegates and has not re-surfaced.
While the proposed Maryland get statute was not passed in this last
attempt, the bill had wide and strong support that suggests it would
have enough support to be voted into law if it were proposed again
in a modified form that better addressed the constitutional
concerns.
B. Florida
Last year, Florida legislators, like those in Maryland, proposed
get legislation that failed to become law. 136 Senator David
Aronberg plans to sponsor the bill again; however, the House
sponsor from 2007 is no longer available so the Senator is looking
for a new co-sponsor.137 Florida, like New York and Maryland, is a
well-populated Jewish state; its constituency comprises more than
10 percent of the country‘s Jewish population. 138 Senator Aronberg
first sponsored the bill after he was approached by Mrs. Abisror, a
constituent who has not been able to receive a get from her
husband, Dr. David Abisror, for over ten years.139 Organizations
like ORA attempted to help Mrs. Abisror by organizing, rallying
and shouting ―Free your wife‖ outside Dr. Abisror‘s office, but
nothing has helped.140 Women‘s International Zionist
Organization‘s (WIZO) executive director, Joan Peppard
Winograd, explained that a get statute would aid women141 like Dr.
Abisror‘s wife to receive a complete divorce and be unburdened by
her unfortunate lack of negotiating stature due to her gender.
The legislation that Senator Aronberg and others in Florida
now seek to propose is similar to the 1992 amendment to New
York‘s equitable distribution laws. Currently, Florida permits
136

HISTORY OF SB 96, supra note 109.
Telephone Interview with Kristen Pesicek, Legislative Assistant to
Senator Dave Aronberg (Oct. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Pesicek].
138
JEWISH YEAR BOOK, supra note 106.
139
Pesicek, supra note 137; see also Lisa J. Huriash, Rally Supports
Woman Seeking Jewish Divorce, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 28, 2007,
available at http://www.giveheraget.com/media.htm.
140
Huriash, supra note 139.
141
Id.
137
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courts to consider a list of factors in determining the equitable
distribution of marital assets and liabilities.142 In a 1997 case,
Bloch v. Bloch, the Florida District Court of Appeals ―implicitly
held‖ that the court could take barriers to remarriage into account
when deciding and distributing assets and liabilities. 143 Florida‘s
proposed legislation, if passed, would codify the Bloch decision
into legislation upon which courts throughout the state could rely.
Florida‘s proposed amendment to the equitable distribution
laws would also add a provision that would include ―the failure or
refusal of one spouse to remove a barrier to remarriage of the other
spouse‖ as another factor for judges to use in evaluating
matrimonial cases. 144 The legislation would have no fiscal impact
in taxes or upon the government sector,145 and would provide a
uniform legal remedy to Florida‘s agunah problem.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Establishment Clause
Critics of the proposed Maryland and Florida get legislation
argue that those laws would violate the Establishment Clause of
the United States‘ Constitution, which states: ―Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .‖146 At
142

Equitable Distribution of Marital Assets and Liabilities, FLA. STAT.
§ 61.075(1)(a)-(j) (1997). Section (1)(j) allows a Florida court to take into
account ―[a]ny other factors necessary to do equity and justice between the
parties.‖ Id. § 61.075(1)(j). This final provision allows the court to use judicial
discretion in dividing property.
143
FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 6; Bloch v. Bloch, 688 So. 2d 945,
946–47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
144
FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 7. ―Barrier to remarriage‖ is defined as
―any religious, secular or conscientious restraint or inhibition of which the
spouse is aware, which is imposed on the other spouse, and which exists by
reason of the spouse‘s commission or withholding of any voluntary act.‖ Id. at 6.
145
Id. at 8.
146
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Maryland bill provides
that a party who files a complaint or countercomplaint for an absolute
divorce or annulment must file, on request of the other party, an
affidavit stating that the affiant has taken all steps solely within the
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the heart of these criticisms is the notion that by entangling the
civil and religious divorce procedures in state courts, the
legislation is tantamount to state-established religion, which
inevitably operates to the detriment of other faiths, religious
practices and to those who do not believe in established religion.147
However, after scrutinizing this issue in the context of the Supreme
Court‘s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it is clear that such
criticisms are misplaced.
Although the Court has yet to rule on this precise constitutional
quandary, it developed a three-prong test in Lemon v. Kurtzman148
to evaluate possible First Amendment violations, vis-à-vis the
Establishment Clause. The test determines the degree and type of
connection between government and religion. To satisfy the test: 1)
there must be a secular purpose for the legislation (purpose prong);
2) there must be a principal or primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion (effects prong); and 3) the statute cannot
―foster an excessive government entanglement with religion‖
(entanglement prong).149 The Lemon test‘s demanding criteria have
been somewhat controversial; 150 however, a bill that can meet
affiant‘s control to remove all religious barriers to remarriage by the
other party. If such an affidavit is requested, the court may not enter a
decree for an absolute divorce or annulment until the affidavit is filed.
DEP‘T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., supra note 112. The Florida bill states that
judges could consider ―the failure or refusal of one spouse to remove a barrier to
remarriage of the other spouse‖ as another factor in evaluating matrimonial
cases. FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 7.
147
See generally Feldman, supra note 29, at 157; Eric Fingerhut, Maryland
Holds Hearing on „Get Law‟, WASH. JEWISH WEEK ONLINE EDITION, Feb. 28,
2008, available at http://www.washingtonjewishweek.com/main.asp?SectionID
=4&SubSectionID=4&ArticleID=6773&TM=39366; Nathaniel Popper, Divorce
Bill Leaves Feminists and Ultra-Orthodox in Bed Together, FORWARD, Feb. 2,
2007, available at http://www.forward.com/artciles/10003/; Wiggins, supra note
120.
148
403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
149
Id.
150
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court noted that due to the wide array
of possible Establishment Clause conflicts, courts have been reluctant to broadly
apply the Lemon test as a universal prism through which to interpret these
issues. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685–86 (2005) (noting that
the Lemon test was not particularly applicable to the erection of a ―passive‖ Ten
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Lemon‘s three prongs will likely satisfy any other Establishment
test.151
1. Purpose Prong
Critics, like Maryland‘s Senator Jamie Raskin, argue that the
proposed get legislation152 does not satisfy the first prong of the
Lemon test, which requires legislation to have a secular purpose,
because ―the entire purpose of this bill is religious . . . .‖153
Additionally, opponents argue that New York‘s stated primary
purpose in enacting legislation was to ―remedy the plight of the
agunah‖ and that her ―dilemma is created by her own religious
convictions.‖154
However, courts have consistently stipulated that Lemon‘s first
prong is ―a fairly low hurdle‖ where any ―clearly secular purpose‖
will suffice.155 Only in rare circumstances has legislation or
Commandments Monument on the Capitol grounds, where Justice William
Rehnquist said, ―[W]e noted that the factors in Lemon serve as ‗no more than
helpful signposts.‘‖) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
Furthermore, the Court, in its overview of particularly recent judicial precedent
on this matter, noted that a great deal of cases have not applied the Lemon test at
all. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Good News
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). Others have only applied the
Lemon test after noticing the practice at issue failed one of the other
Establishment Clause tests. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 685–86.
151
Professor Breitowitz properly defended the get statute in the context of
the Lemon test, while presupposing that by passing the three prongs of the
Lemon test the statute would ultimately survive the First Amendment‘s
Establishment Clause bar. He stated:
To the extent the get law furthers state interests of a secular nature and
does not endorse or advance the cause of religion, but simply levels the
playing field by removing a disability that is peculiar to a particular
religious class, the statute passes muster not only to Lemon but under
any probable alternative test that the Supreme Court is likely to adopt.
Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 419.
152
Including both New York § 253 and the proposed Maryland statute.
153
Wiggins, supra note 120 (quoting Senator Jamie Raskin).
154
Feldman, supra note 29, at 156.
155
Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 276 (4th Cir. 2001); see McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (finding that there was a secular purpose in
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governmental action been invalidated on the ground that a secular
purpose was lacking.156 In such cases, the conduct was ―motivated
wholly [by] religious considerations.‖157 According to Marc
Feldman, the get statute‘s secular purpose is to ―remove[] a
husband‘s ability to hold his wife hostage to his
demands . . .[p]reventing extortion or infliction of emotional
distress . . . .‖158 Furthermore, a ―state has a legitimate secular
interest‖ in guaranteeing that its laws maintain ―integrity and
efficacy‖ in its courts; therefore, the policies underlying the get
laws are to do away with dead marriages and to allow parties to
―have the freedom to rebuild their lives anew.‖159
As Sarah Rosenbloom, a Maryland resident and agunah,
explained, she ―just want[ed] to live . . . [in] freedom . . . [and not
to] be a caged bird anymore.‖160 When barriers to remarriage are
sustained, the divorce laws of a state are ―frustrate[d],‖ as is the
―integrity of the judicial system.‖ 161 Get legislation is aimed at
giving wives the same rights as husbands and removing women
from a ―hostage situation‖ where husbands have the power to deny
a get and abuse their wives. 162
Maryland‘s proposed get legislation has several additional
secular purposes.163 For instance, the legislation promotes ―new
family formation by removing voluntarily maintained barriers to
remarriage.‖164 Maryland advocates have emphasized that one of
the purposes of civil divorces is to allow parties to remarry; this

Closing laws on Sundays).
156
See Brown, 258 F.3d at 276.
157
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (emphasis added).
158
Feldman, supra note 29, at 157.
159
Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 385.
160
Tamber, supra note 130 (quoting Sarah Rosenbloom).
161
Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 385.
162
Tamber, supra note 130 (quoting Cynthia Ohana).
163
For similar arguments to those made throughout Part III, see Letter from
Kathryn M. Rowe, Maryland Assistant Attorney General, to Samuel I.
Rosenberg, Bill Sponsor, Maryland Delegate (Jan. 12, 2007) (on file with
Maryland Legislative Services) [hereinafter Rowe].
164
Id. at 2.
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legislation would act in concert with that purpose.165 Furthermore,
the proposed legislation would require parties seeking a divorce to
do so fairly and with ―clean hands,‖ 166 so that ―[h]e who seeks
equity, must do equity.‖ 167 Ultimately, the legislation will protect
women‘s rights and avoid coercion168 and spousal abuse in
negotiations related to divorce, as has been the response to the
New York legislation.
Similar to Maryland, Florida officials have also stated that a
secular purpose of passing their get legislation is to promote the
―right to marry (or remarry).‖ 169 Florida proponents also suggest
that the proposed get statute encourages fair distribution of assets,
as in the situation of ―a wife whose future income is limited by the
inability to remarry a larger amount.‖170 Lastly, the Florida bill was
written in an impartial fashion to avoid constitutional problems.171
Both the Maryland and Florida bills, then, would pass the first
prong of the Lemon test because they both have valid secular
purposes.172
2. Effects Prong
Under the Lemon test‘s second prong, government conduct or
legislation is valid if it ―neither advances nor inhibits religion.‖173
Critics to get laws argue that they ―incorporate[] Jewish divorce
law into state law, and thus advance[] the Jewish religion by
facilitating remarriage of observant Jews . . . [and also that] the
mere appearance of the joint exercise of judicial authority by
church and state provide[] symbolic endorsement of the Jewish

165

See id.
Id. (quoting Schneider v. Schneider, 644 A.2d 510, 514 (Md. 1994)).
167
Id. (quoting Merryman v. Bremmer, 241 A.2d 558, 565 (Md. 1968)).
168
Id.
169
FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 5.
170
Id.
171
Id. Florida defined ―‗barrier[s] to remarriage‘ to include ‗without
limitation, any religious or conscientious restraint or inhibition.‘‖ Id.
172
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
173
Id. at 612.
166
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religion to the detriment of others.‖174 Although it is true that such
legislation will have a direct impact on get deliveries among
Jewish couples, the Supreme Court has stated that ―[c]omparisons
of the relative benefits to religion of different forms of
governmental support are elusive and difficult to make.‖ 175
Additionally, the Court has upheld a variety of endorsements and
benefits to religion and stated that they did not violate the
Establishment Clause. 176 Furthermore, in Lynch v. Donnelly,
Justice O‘Connor explained that government conduct should be
invalidated if it sends ―a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.‖ 177 Here, the law does not
fail Justice O‘Connor‘s standard because it does not send a
message that Jews are a favored class of people. It merely seeks to
eliminate a problem for which only observant female Jews suffer
and are victimized into a subordinate position where they cannot
remarry within their faith.178
In analyzing the Maryland bill, a court should find that the
primary or principal effect of the proposed bill is not to further
religion, but rather to further the stated secular purposes.179 There
is no governmental endorsement of religion because the proposed
legislation contains no explicit mention of any Jewish custom or
practice; specifically, neither the get nor agunah is mentioned.180
While the statute was formulated to combat coercion and extortion
afflicting Jewish women, ―it is not drafted so as to be limited to
174

Feldman, supra note 29, at 157.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984).
176
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 236 (1968) (holding that
the purchase of textbooks, bought through state tax funds and supplied to
students attending religious schools, is valid because the law had a relevant
benefit to all children in school); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(holding that a statute reimbursing parents for bus fares to their children‘s
religious schools passes constitutional muster).
177
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O‘Connor, J., concurring).
178
See discussion supra Part I.B.
179
See Rowe, supra note 163, at 2.
180
Id.
175
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that religious group and does not incorporate into civil law any
aspect of Jewish religious practice.‖181 The legislation has a
desired long-term effect to encourage remarriage, which is a
secular purpose, and although the short-term effect of avoiding
coercive civil divorce proceedings is religious in character, this
should not invalidate its predominantly secular effect.182
The counterargument to Lemon‘s second prong is that the
proposed legislation would compel a husband to complete a
religious act, i.e., deliver a get, before a civil divorce is entered.183
Critics argue that ―the delivery of a [g]et is clearly a religious act
because the sole justification for it is attached to the Jewish
religion and that ‗there is no secular justification for such a
[religious] divorce since a civil divorce legally terminates the
marriage.‘‖184
There is a question, however, as to whether the get even
constitutes a religious act.185 The get can be construed as a non181

Id.
Id.
183
FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 5.
184
Id. at 4 (quoting Lawrence C. Marshall, The Religion Clauses and
Compelled Religious Divorces: A Study in Marital and Constitutional
Separations, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 204, 219 (1985) (emphasis added)).
185
Id. at 5–6. Litigation over contract law (see discussion infra Part I)
sheds further light on the judicial approach to the Establishment Clause
controversy with respect to whether the get is in fact a religious act. In Minkin v.
Minkin, the court, sua sponte, heard testimony from several different rabbis to
ascertain whether delivering a get should be considered a ―religious act.‖ See
Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665, 667–68 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1981)
(emphasis added).
Rabbi Macy Gordon testified that the get is the ―severance of a contractual
relationship between two parties,‖ and, therefore, ordering delivery of a get
would not entangle the court with religion. Id. at 667. Rabbi Judah Washer
agreed that the get is a civil document that makes no mention of God and does
not require ―religious feelings of people, but is only concerned with the right of
the wife to remarry.‖ Id. Rabbi Menahem Meier and Rabbi Richard Kurtz
testified that the get deals with the relationship between man and man and not
God and man, and therefore it is civil and not religious in nature. Id. at 668.
Under this line of reasoning, the court concluded that it was not infringing on
the husband‘s constitutional rights by ordering a get and the court ordered Mr.
Minkin to do so. See id. at 667.
182
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religious act because ―it does not involve worship or the profession
of faith, a husband who has renounced Judaism can obtain a [g]et,
and appointed representatives can actually obtain the [g]et on
behalf of the husband.‖186 If in fact the get does not constitute a
religious act, the proposed equitable distribution laws and get
statute would not have the principal or primary effect of advancing
religion. The husband would thus not be engaging in a religious
activity, and any religious effect would be indirect or incidental.
Under these circumstances, the get bills would pass the Lemon
test‘s second prong.187
3. Entanglement Prong
Under the Lemon test‘s third prong, government conduct is
valid if it does not ―foster an impermissible degree of
entanglement‖ with religion.188 Maryland Senator Jamie Raskin, as
well as other critics, argued that the bill ―does entangle the state
with religion.‖189 Further, Maryland residents expressed concern
that Maryland ―would [have to] entertain detailed and extensive
discussions of religious doctrine in a civil matter . . . .‖190
However, the Supreme Court has continuously interpreted this
element not to require complete separation of church and state,
since some governmental interaction with religion or religious
organizations is inevitable and may in some cases be necessary. 191
The Court‘s interpretation finds entanglement to be a question ―of
kind and degree,‖ and for invalidation there must be excessive
entanglement between the government‘s conduct and religion or a
religious organization. 192
186

Id. (citing Zornberg, supra note 35, at 74; Marshall, supra note 185, at

218).
187
188
189

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
Id. at 612.
Wiggins, supra note 120 (quoting Senator Jamie Raskin) (emphasis

added).
190

Tamber, supra note 130 (quoting Tim Faith).
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
192
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). See Lemon, 403 U.S. at
615 (holding that the direct government aid for teachers‘ salaries and textbooks
191
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Nathan Lewin, a Washington D.C. lawyer, explained that ―the
bill is constitutional because it does not force anyone to ‗profess a
belief‘ or commit a ‗religious act,‘ only take ‗objective secular
steps‘ such as signing a document affirming any barriers to
remarriage have been eliminated.‖193 Furthermore, Maryland‘s
proposed legislation was in fact ―drafted to avoid excessive
entanglement.‖194 The parties to the litigation decide whether to
require an affidavit stating that the get was delivered. When it is
required, the court need not involve itself in religious matters,
rather it only needs to record whether the affidavit was filed and
consider any evidence if there was a ―knowingly false
statement.‖195 Justifiably, Maryland‘s Assistant Attorney General,
Kathryn Rowe, found these limited responsibilities far short of
―excessive entanglement.‖196 However, assuming arguendo that
the legislation does run into First Amendment problems, Ms. Rowe
contends that ―it would likely be upheld if challenged.‖197
Florida‘s proposed get law is also likely to pass Lemon‘s third
prong because the proposed statute only requires the court to serve
as a document checker in an effort to determine whether the get
was granted.198 This does not overly entangle government with
religion because the ―determination is made by the sworn
statements of the plaintiff and the officiating cleric.‖199 While the
bill analysis, performed by the Florida judiciary committee, shows
some hesitance, it notes that the proposed get statute has survived
judicial scrutiny. 200 To conclude, while the Lemon test‘s three
in religious schools resulted in an excessive entanglement).
193
Fingerhut, supra note 147 (quoting Nathan Lewin).
194
Rowe, supra note 163, at 3.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 1. In the only constitutional challenge to the New York get statute,
the appellate court found the lower court should not have entertained the
husband‘s motion that Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(h) was
unconstitutional because upon the husband‘s filing, the wife waived all of her
rights under the get statute, making the issue moot. Becher v. Becher, 245
A.D.2d 408, 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
198
FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 6.
199
Id.
200
Id. See also Becher, 245 A.D.2d at 409.
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prongs present demanding criteria, attacks on the constitutionality
of proposed get laws under the Establishment Clause will likely
fail.
B. Free Exercise Clause
Critics also argue that get legislation would violate the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which states that
―Congress shall make no law. . . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion].‖201 The Free Exercise Clause ―affirmatively mandates
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids
hostility toward any.‖202A violation under the Free Exercise Clause
takes place when ―government action interferes with a sincere
religious belief.‖203 Free Exercise violations include when
(1) the state forces an individual to do that which his
religion prohibits or discourages; (2) the state prevents an
individual from doing that which his religion requires or
encourages; (3) the state makes religious observance more
difficult or expensive; or (4) the state forces an individual
to do something ‗religious‘ that he wishes not to do,
although his opposition is not necessarily based on his
religious beliefs. 204
The Supreme Court uses the ―highest level of scrutiny‖ for
Free Exercise cases, employing the ―compelling interest‖ test to
make constitutional determinations. 205 Under this test, the
government has the burden to show that its conduct or legislation
201

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
203
Jamie Alan Aycock, Contracting Out of the Culture Wars: How the Law
Should Enforce and Communities of Faith Should Encourage More Enduring
Marital Commitments, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 231, 270–71 (2006).
204
Marshall, supra note 185, at 214.
205
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court reduced the standard of review in
religious freedom cases to a reasonableness standard. However, the Court
limited this new standard to situations involving religiously neutral laws. Id. The
proposed get laws address the agunah problem and thus the Smith standard does
not apply.
202
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does not impose ―a significant burden upon a person‘s free
exercise of religion‖ and that there is in fact a compelling state
interest.206
Critics of the get law argue that ―[b]y conditioning the grant of
a civil remedy on the performance of a religious ceremony, the
statute arguably infringes the free exercise rights of the otherwise
unwilling spouse.‖207 In other words, critics argue that the
proposed legislation essentially forces a husband to deliver a get to
his wife, or else receive an inequitable distribution of property
during the civil divorce proceedings. Thus, it could violate the Free
Exercise Clause because the laws operate regardless of the
husband‘s objections to giving a get, and because the husband is
pushed to engage in activities he does not want to do.
Ardent supporters of the proposed get laws, however, contend
that get legislation does not raise Free Exercise problems because
it does not force couples to do, or not do, anything. Professor
Breitowitz explains that under New York‘s get legislation, the
court does not directly command the husband to do anything; ―it
simply conditions obtaining relief on the removal of barriers.‖ 208 If
a husband chooses not to remove barriers to remarriage, there are
no additional burdens placed upon him; rather, he is left in the
same position and maintains ―the status quo.‖209
In Maryland, the proposed get legislation would not violate the
Free Exercise Clause because it does not force a person to join or
engage in a religious practice that he has ―not already accepted
voluntarily.‖210 When a husband delivers his wife a get, there are
no ―professions of faith nor devotional acts.‖211 The text of the get
does not make any mention of God, but rather states that the
husband is announcing to the world that this woman is able to

206

Aycock, supra note 203, at 271.
Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 394.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Rowe, supra note 163, at 3.
211
Id. (quoting Tanina Rostain, Note, Permissible Accommodations of
Religion: Reconsidering the New York Get Statute, 96 YALE L.J. 1147, 1168
(1987)).
207
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remarry in the Jewish community. 212 Thus, Maryland‘s proposed
legislation would not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
The constitutional analytical framework for Florida‘s bill asks
whether the get laws ―force a husband to commit an act despite his
religious objection and therefore place a substantial burden on the
husband‘s religious conduct.‖213 The question of Free Exercise
turns on whether the get is in fact a religious act.214 On one hand,
jurists and scholars have argued that there is no ―secular
justification‖ because a couple does not need a get in order to
obtain a civil divorce. 215 Such a couple‘s marriage would
effectively cease to exist under state law after obtaining a civil
divorce.216 On the other hand, the get does not require any actual
religious devotion, or professing one‘s religious faith. For instance,
―a husband who has renounced Judaism can obtain a Get, and
appointed representatives can actually obtain the Get on behalf of
the husband.‖217
While the get statutes in both Maryland and Florida do raise
some potential constitutional issues because they would be enacted
to remedy an arguably religious concern, they are likely to be
upheld, if challenged, following the New York model.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR MARYLAND AND FLORIDA
CONCERNING THE GET LEGISLATION
The proposed get statutes in Maryland and Florida did not fail
because people were opposed to the fundamental premise of the
statute, but due to political pitfalls that can be avoided in the
future.218 By avoiding these pitfalls, proponents of the get statutes
212

Rostain, supra note 211, at 1168; Rowe, supra note 163, at 3.
FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 4 (citing Nadel, supra note 81, at 95;
Zornberg, supra note 35, at 742).
214
See supra Part III.A.
215
FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 4 (quoting Marshall, supra note 185, at
219).
216
Id.
217
Id. (emphasis added). See also Marshall, supra note 185, at 218;
Zornberg, supra note 35, at 741.
218
Senator Aronberg‘s office explained that the get statute failed to pass in
213
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can take steps to assure each bill‘s successful passage into law.
First, it almost goes without saying that an uncontroversial title
is a good start. In Maryland, the 2007 get bill was initially titled,
―Removal of Religious Barriers to Remarriage.‖219 The get
statute‘s purpose already raises constitutional concerns; therefore,
including the word ―religious‖ in the title invites obvious critique
from opponents. A get bill‘s title should remain religiously neutral;
any future bill should either remove the word ―religious‖ or create
another title. In New York, for example, the statute is called,
―Removal of Barriers to Remarriage,‖ 220 excluding the ―religious‖
title and connotation.
Second, in framing the issue within the legal context, the
statute‘s flexibility in providing the wife with her fair share of the
assets should be considered a paramount goal. Even though New
York uses the equitable distribution model, alimony is friendlier to
all parties involved because it makes the amount of alimony
essentially contingent on whether the wife receives a get. Unlike
equitable distribution, which is determined at one instant by the
court and is thereafter unchanged, alimony has the elastic
capability to be adjusted over time.221 In this situation, a judge can
amend the alimony requirements after a get is obtained. This
benefits all parties involved: the woman benefits because receiving
the get inevitably frees her of the agunah problem as it allows her
to remarry within her faith, while the former husband benefits by
having the alimony reduced when he provides the woman with the
get.
By having the proposed get statute involve alimony as the ideal
2008 for ―political reasons‖ that were not in any way connected to the proposed
legislation. The legislation is said to have ―sailed‖ through the Senate and while
the statute‘s advocates in the Senate were ready to speak, they were told there
was no need because there was already so much support for the legislation.
Pesicek, supra note 137. See also supra Part II.A.
219
DEP‘T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., supra note 112 (emphasis added). The
Senate Judicial Proceedings agreed that this title was inappropriate and amended
the title to ―Removal of Barriers to Remarriage‖ before the second vote. Floor
Report, Senate Bill 533, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee.
220
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1983).
221
Bay Hill Area Law Firm, Family Law, http://www.lawgrp.net/
family_law.html. (last visited Jan. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Bay Hill].
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tool for marital asset distribution, it also allows the judge to
alleviate the financial burdens of post-divorce maintenance on the
husband after he performs his civic and religious duties vis-à-vis
the delivery of the get. Keeping in mind the constitutional pitfalls
of punishing American citizens for the failure to perform religious
duties, this statute treads the fine line of the First Amendment by
incentivizing get deliverance, thereby promoting ideals of
egalitarianism and an extortion-free atmosphere post-marriage.
To illustrate the deficiencies of using equitable distribution, it
is helpful to briefly view Florida‘s most recent failed attempt to
pass get legislation. Florida proposed that when a spouse fails to
remove a barrier to remarriage for the other spouse, the court may
use this obstacle in determining equitable distribution of marital
assets.222 In Florida, equitable distribution requires all marital
assets223 to be distributed equally, unless there has been ―unequal
treatment.‖224 The court will consider a variety of factors in
distributing the assets.225 A property settlement following a divorce
is ―final and not modifiable;‖226 therefore, using equitable
distribution to solve the get problem creates a serious dilemma.
Situations will arise where a ―divorcing party may not know about
the barrier to remarriage until after the Final Judgment has been
entered . . . and you cannot go back and re-do equitable
distribution.‖227 Alternatively, alimony228 can be modified ―upon a
222

FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 6.
Marital assets include ―all property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage . . . plus interspousal gifts.‖ Bay Hill, supra note 221.
224
Id.
225
These factors include:
contribution to the marriage, economic circumstances, interruption of
personal career or education by a spouse, contribution by one spouse to
the career and education of the other, the desirability of one spouse
retaining a particular asset, the length of the marriage, the desirability
of retaining the marital home as a residence for dependent children, and
misconduct that depleted the marital assets within 2 years of filing.
Id.
226
Letter from Nelson Diaz, Florida Attorney, to Kristen Pesicek,
Legislative Aide, Senator Aronberg (Apr. 21, 2008) (emphasis added) (on file
with author).
227
Id.
223

WEXLER_6-5-09

6/6/2009 1:17 PM

GOTTA GET A GET

773

showing of a substantial change in circumstances or financial
ability to pay of either party.‖ 229
This model was utilized in the British case, Brett v. Brett,230
where the court did not deny the husband a divorce, but rather
raised his alimony payment so that the wife could maintain her
standard of living. The court explained that this award of
maintenance could not be used to punish the husband; however,
the husband‘s actions were taken into account and were relevant to
some extent.231 The court then awarded the wife a lump sum in
alimony and an additional amount every year until the husband
gave the wife a get to compensate her for the disadvantage she
faced by not remarrying and gaining financial security from a new
husband.232 A statute codifying Brett‘s holding would warn the
husband that in order to hold on to more property and assets, a get
must be delivered. Additionally, the law would not force or coerce
the husband to grant his wife a get, but rather place the wife in the
financial position she would be in if her husband granted her a get
and she was free to remarry and obtain more property. The get
statute would also eliminate any extortion the husband may induce
upon the wife because the court could balance the assets in
alimony, which it awarded to the wife. Notably, the fact that
alimony is modifiable would enable the court to change the
alimony if the husband eventually grants the wife a get, or allow it
to increase the alimony as well.
Lastly, Maryland and Florida sponsors should invoke judicial
228

Alimony is a ―support obligation available to either spouse.‖ Bay Hill,
supra note 221. Maryland law concerning alimony is very similar and would
allow for alimony modification. The ―Court may Modify the amount of alimony
awarded as circumstances and justice require.‖ Overviews of the Laws in
Maryland Regarding Alimony, Alimony in Maryland, http://www.matney
lawfirm.com/maryland.alimony (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
229
Bay Hill, supra note 221.
230
Brett v. Brett, (1969) 1 W.L.R. 487 (Eng.). In this case, the husband
refused to grant his wife a get for ―tactical reasons‖ and ―thus precluding the
possibility of the wife remarrying and finding some other man to support her in
the event of her wishing to do so.‖ Id. at 488.
231
The court emphasized ―the wife‘s age and the prospect that she might
remarry were she to become free to do so . . . .‖ Id.
232
Id. at 487.
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precedent to attract widespread support and promote its passage
into legislation. Legislators will be more persuasive in urging the
bill‘s passage if they emphasize that jurists have already shown
that the bill is workable and equitable in practice, as was shown
over a decade ago in New York. In 1992, for example, this tool
was utilized to pass the New York equitable distribution
amendment, following the decision in Schwartz v. Schwartz,233
which held that if a man withholds a get from his wife, such a
barrier could be taken into account when dividing marital property
and assets.234 New York legislators cited Schwartz for the
proposition that the equitable distribution amendment merely
clarified existing law. 235 Judges already had the equitable
discretion to make such considerations in factor thirteen of the
equitable distribution law, 236 but by passing a law that would apply
uniformly to such situations the legislature announced that the
judges‘ considerations were appropriate.
Similarly, Florida legislators could put greater emphasis in
their next attempt on the Bloch decision, which implicitly held that
a court could take a husband‘s withholding of a get into
consideration when determining equitable distribution and
alimony. 237 Using a judicial decision as the backdrop to the bill‘s
campaign, proponents of the bill would be further justified in
saying, ―Judge[s] . . . ha[ve] agreed with this and . . . believe that
the law does empower [them] to do this.‖238 By properly making
use of such judicial authority, proponents could provide additional
reassurance to other legislators so that the bill could quickly move
to passage.

233

153 Misc. 2d 789, 792 (1992).
Zornberg, supra note 35, at 735 (―Justice Rigler found statutory
authorization for this decision in factor thirteen of the equitable distribution law,
the ‗catchall‘ provision requiring the court to consider ‗any other factor which
the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.‘‖).
235
Id.
236
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(13) (McKinney 1983). ―[A]ny
other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.‖ Id.
237
Bloch v. Bloch, 688 So. 2d 946, 946 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
238
Id. (quoting Anthony Daniele, Matrimonial Attorney).
234
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V. CONCLUSION
This Note recommends that Maryland and Florida adopt get
legislation in order to alleviate the agunah problem and reform the
growing coercive and extortive tactics of Jewish husbands
concerning the terms of delivery of the get. While community
outreach and contract law have tried to conquer the agunah
problem, Jewish women remain ―in [a] state of marital limbo.‖239
The large Jewish populations in both Maryland and Florida suggest
similarly large groups of women in those states face the agunah
problem. A legislative effort, which is already under way in states
that have significant Jewish populations like Maryland and Florida,
is the best tool to protect these female victims whose religious
standards pressure them into an inferior bargaining position and de
facto subordination.
Maryland and Florida‘s past attempts, though unsuccessful,
have shown that there is potentially widespread support and
growing need for help and legislation. If passed, a get statute
would only require minimal state funds and, if properly drafted,
could avoid the limited constitutional entanglements with respect
to the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment. This Note proposes the New York statute as the
paradigm for success—substantively, focusing the bill on
alleviating alimony payments as an incentive to ―remove barriers
to remarriage‖ instead of the currently-used equitable distribution
model would provide flexibility without unconstitutionally forcing
a religious practice. It is also quite possible to present a religiously
neutral statute, while at the same time galvanize the religious
communities to support the process. The plight of women suffering
the agunah problem is serious, and both Florida and Maryland
need to address it through effective get legislation.

239

Feldman, supra note 29, at 140.

